Real, not Nominal, Global Democracy: A Reply to Robert Keohane by Kuyper, Jonathan & DRYZEK, John
 1 
Real not Nominal Global Democracy: A Response to Keohane 
Jonathan Kuyper and John S. Dryzek 
1. Introduction 
In a recent article for this journal, Robert Keohane argues against the possibility and 
promise of global democracy.1 Drawing upon Krasner’s notion of ‘organized 
hypocrisy’, Keohane suggests that democracy in global governance is merely a norm 
without substantive practice. Efforts to develop global democracy without creating the 
necessary preconditions will led to a hollow nominal global democracy. 
Keohane is not actually hostile to the normative value of democracy in global 
governance. Indeed, his dismissal of global democracy in the short term is 
accompanied in his exposition by hope for the long term. However, this short 
term/long term distinction obscures the way arguments for global democracy are now 
in fact made (it is noteworthy that Keohane does not cite any actual contemporary 
proponent of global democracy, criticizing instead what he thinks their arguments 
ought to be). Keohane errs in his invocation of ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ democracy (as the 
opposite of nominal democracy) and in his belief that global democrats would have to 
be people who want to institutionalize a model of some sort in the near future. 
Keohane’s central claim is that genuine democracy “requires elections that 
hold elected leaders accountable to publics and other arrangements that hold non-
elected leaders accountable to elected ones.”2 While some utopian global democrats 
see elections as necessary,3 other global democrats take the impossibility of global 
elections as a key starting point. Notably, deliberative democrats offer a 
                                                        
1 Robert O. Keohane, Nominal democracy? Prospects for democratic global governance 13(2) INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 344 (2015). 
2 Keohane, supra note 1, 344. 
3 Most notably, those associated with the Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly; see 
http://en.unpacampaign.org. 
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communication-centric (as opposed to vote-centric) view of democracy in which the 
essence of democracy is to be sought in inclusive and consequential deliberation on 
the part of those affected by the decision in question.4 Deliberation can involve 
advocates and representatives, whose democratic legitimacy can be scrutinized even if 
they are not elected.5 John Keane’s magisterial history of democracy concludes not 
with electoral democracy, but rather with a post-parliamentary ‘monitory democracy’ 
composed of multiple mechanisms through which power is held to account – most of 
which transfer rather easily to the transnational level.6 We will show how conceiving 
of democracy in non-electoral terms makes an enormous difference to its global 
governance prospects. 
For Keohane, democracy also requires the effective rule of law, vibrant civil 
society, and transparent leadership. Unfortunately, Keohane claims, realizing genuine 
democracy in global governance is not possible for at least five reasons. First, 
democracy would require sacrificing other goods that are equally, if not more, 
important. Second, there is no global equivalent of the nation-state to make us 
sacrifice short-term personal gains for long-term collective goods. Third, there is no 
shared global identity and associated emotion to underpin democracy. Fourth, the rule 
of law has a weak history in the international system. Finally global governance lacks 
the civil society in which social capital can be constructed. 
 In this response we unpack Keohane’s arguments and show why they are 
defective. We make two broad claims in doing so. First, Keohane has neglected to 
engage systematically with literature on democratic global governance from 
                                                        
4 For a survey of deliberative approaches to global democracy, see William Smith and James Brassett, 
Deliberation and global governance: liberal, cosmopolitan, and critical perspectives, 22(1) ETHICS & 
INT’L AFFAIRS 69-92 (2008). 
5 Jonathan W. Kuyper, Systemic Representation: Democracy, Deliberation, and Non-Electoral 
Representatives, 110(2) AM. POL. SCI. REV. (2016). 
6 JOHN KEANE, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF DEMOCRACY (2009). 
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international law and political theory that provide responses to his concerns. Second, 
we suggest that Keohane’s view of ‘genuine democracy’ as liberal electoral 
democracy is too narrow, and indeed based on a problematic view of how state-level 
democracy actually works. A deliberative view of democracy that puts inclusive and 
egalitarian reasoned communication at its core helps show how substantive 
democracy can be pursued in global governance.  
 Our response moves forward in four sections. In section two we contest the 
lessons Keohane draws from his two case studies. Section three elaborates 
deliberative democracy’s solutions to Keohane’s “three gaps in global governance”. 
The fourth section reconceptualizes democratic global governance as a normative 
project of multiple democratization moves – as opposed to the acceptance and 
implementation of any well-specified model. 
 
2. Problems with Keohane’s Case Lessons 
 
2.1 Trade-offs with democracy? On Kadi  
Keohane deploys two case studies to highlight the trade-offs between democracy and 
other values. The first is Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and 
Commission.7 The sanction regime constructed by the UN Security Council and 
implemented by the European Union was designed to stop money laundering for 
terrorist activities and enabled states to freeze assets of those suspected of aiding 
terrorism. In this well-known case Kadi contested to have his name removed from the 
sanctions list. In 2008 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in 
                                                        
7 Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v. Council & Comm'n, 2008 E.CR 
1-6351 [hereinafter Kadi]. 
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favor of Kadi, striking down the EU regulation on the grounds that it infringed upon 
individual ‘fundamental rights’.  
 For Keohane, the Kadi case (and subsequent CJEU appeal, also won by Kadi8) 
highlights the trade-off between democratic rule of law (as upheld by the CJEU) and 
UN Security Council efforts to hamper terrorism and money laundering: protecting 
rights required rolling back security. This analysis is misleading. The victory of Kadi 
did not mean that democracy and security stand inherently in tension. All it means is 
that the specific regime pushed by the United States through the UN Security Council 
required reworking to fit with EU law. The introduction of an ombudsman in UN 
Security Council Resolution 1904/2009 helps bring the UN regime into line with EU 
standards. What Keohane would need to show for his contention to hold is that the 
introduction of an ombudsman and/or a more democratic UN sanction regime is (or 
has) led to an increase in terrorist financing or support. As it stands, the ombudsman 
is supposed to provide a mechanism to check whether individuals really are security 
threats. In this way, the addition of democratic ‘checks and balances’ to the UN 
decision-making may actually promote better (i.e. more security-centered) outcomes.  
 Seen in this light, it is possible to view the Kadi case as a significant boost for 
global democratic efforts, as Nico Krisch argues.9 Krisch contends that the lack of 
hierarchy between the UN and the EU opened up a situation in which no one actor has 
final rule making authority. This generated flexibility such that individuals could 
deliberatively contest rules (even those created by superpowers). This, Krisch 
suggests, is key to establishing new forms of democratic global governance as 
individuals are able to challenge and ultimately shape the rules that govern their lives. 
                                                        
8 Joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Commission and Others v. Kadi, Judgment, 
July 18, 2013, ¶ 134. 
9 NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF 
POSTNATIONAL LAW (2011). 
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2.2 A Second Trade-off? On Climate Change 
 
Keohane’s second case study concerns climate change. We agree with Keohane that 
accelerating anthropogenic climate change is perhaps the most challenging issue of 
our time. Keohane paints a familiar picture of seventeen years of gridlock besetting 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) after the Kyoto 
Protocol was agreed in 1997.10  
 While recognizing that the undersupply of public goods to solve climate 
change is a malign equilibrium, Keohane argues that “democracy does not seem to 
help” in overcoming the collective action problem. Two reasons undergird his claim. 
First, increased inclusion, transparency, and discussion in the UNFCCC did not 
produce agreement from 1998-2014. Second, even once Kyoto was agreed, rejection 
by democratic states such as the US, and abandonment of commitments by Canada, 
Australia, and Japan, highlight the disjuncture between democracy and effective 
climate action. 
 Keohane’s argument falls short on two fronts. First Keohane claims that 
democratic decision-making undermines effective climate action. However in order to 
substantiate this claim, he would need to show that some other form of authoritarian 
(or, at least, non-democratic) decision-making has been more successful at mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions. Given the 2015 Paris Agreement not only involved – but 
also substantively relied upon – the commitments of 196 states and thousands of non-
state actors, it is not immediately clear that a less inclusive or less transparent 
UNFCCC would have done better.11 
                                                        
10 DAVID G. VICTOR, GLOBAL WARMING GRIDLOCK (2011). 
11 UNFCCC, Adoption of the Paris Agreement. Draft decision FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1. Available at 
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.  
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 Second, Keohane does not mention work that suggests democracy is beneficial 
for dealing with environmental issues and climate change. The extensive literature on 
deliberative democracy and the environment makes a number of claims, including the 
idea that deliberation brings common-interest arguments to the fore and so helps solve 
collective action problems, and also that deliberation is a particularly good way of 
integrating diverse perspectives on complex issues in the service of effective problem-
solving.12 Inclusive argumentation that exposes viewpoints to competing positions 
facilitates crafting effective collective decisions.13 Evidence from small-scale 
deliberative forums supports these theoretical claims.14 While there is less evidence 
from macro level studies, we know that consensual democracies do better than 
adversarial ones when it comes to environmental performance.15 We also have 
evidence that consensual democracies are more deliberative than adversarial ones.16 
Joining the dots suggests a positive association between deliberative democracy and 
environmental performance. Finally, including actors in deliberation over policies 
facilitates compliance.17 In this light, it is possible to evaluate global climate 
governance in terms of its deliberative and democratic qualities that are also crucial in 
determining effectiveness.18 If those qualities are currently lacking, the challenge is to 
strengthen them – rather than give up and turn our backs. 
                                                        
12 See among many others WALTER F. BABER AND ROBERT V. BARTLETT, DELIBERATIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: DEMOCRACY AND ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY (2005). 
13 HÉLÈNE LANDEMORE AND JON ELSTER, EDS. COLLECTIVE WISDOM: PRINCIPLES 
AND MECHANISMS (2012). 
14 Simon Niemeyer, Deliberation in the Wilderness: Displacing Symbolic Politics 13(2) ENV. POL. 
347-72 (2004); MIKKO RASK, RICHARD WORTHINGTON, AND MINNA LAMMI, CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (2012). 
15 LYLE SCRUGGS, SUSTAINING ABUNDANCE: ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE IN 
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES (2003). 
16 JÜRG STEINER, ANDRÉ BÄCHTIGER, MARKUS SPÖRNDLI, AND MARCO 
STEENBERGEN, DELIBERATIVE POLITICS IN ACTION: ANALYSING PARLIAMENTARY 
DISCOURSE (2004). 
17 Simon Birnbaum, Örjan Bodin, and Annica Sandström, Tracing the sources of legitimacy: the 
impact of deliberation in participatory natural resource management, 48(4) POLICY SCI. (2015). 
18 HAYLEY STEVENSON AND JOHN S. DRYZEK, DEMOCRATIZING GLOBAL CLIMATE 
GOVERNANCE (2014) 
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3. Deliberative Responses to Keohane’s “Gaps in Global 
Governance” 
We now discuss Keohane’s “three gaps in global governance” that underpin his 
objections to global democracy and show how deliberative democracy can respond. 
 
3.1 The Interest-Public Goods Gap 
Keohane suggests that nation-states – through a combination of nationalism and the 
demonization of ‘others’ – have been able to mobilize individuals to place the 
collective above the individual, and so solve collective action problems. But even 
here, in his discussion of climate governance Keohane points to the inability of the 
United States in particular to provide public goods in response to the challenge of 
climate change. Keohane implicitly shares the proclivities of an earlier generation of 
democracy scholars in comparative politics to treat the United States as the paradigm 
democratic state. It is not. He argues that democracy in the US means inaction on the 
pressing issue of climate change. But the United States (along with Australia and until 
recently Canada) is actually an outlier among democratic states when it comes to the 
inability of its legislature to act on climate policy. The fact that well-funded special 
interests can effectively preclude action reflects the failure of democracy, not 
democracy in action. The moral we would draw is that the United States needs to be 
democratized in order to make its public policies more responsive to the reflective 
preferences of its citizens (not the same as unreflective preferences revealed by 
opinion polls). Exactly the same logic holds for the global system; in both cases, 
deliberative mechanisms can be sought in order to better supply public goods. 
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 Keohane is right that democracy, when viewed purely in terms of the 
aggregation of preferences through voting, is likely to sacrifice long-term values for 
short-term material gains.19 However democracy seen as inclusive and egalitarian 
deliberation is much less likely to do this – we have evidence that deliberation 
induces a concern for the long term in both individuals and collectivities.20  
 
3.2 The Emotional Gap 
Keohane argues that world politics does not contain the types of symbols and 
emotions necessary to sustain effective governance of the sort we find in nation-
states. But here Keohane puts the cart before the horse. Historically, effective states 
have not depended on any pre-existing shared emotional attachments. Rather, states 
generally precede nations; one of the key tasks in state-building is the creation of a 
national identity to accompany the state. Further, as Arash Abizedeh has argued, a 
collective identity does not have to presuppose a global other, but can be generated 
internally through deliberation or recognition. 21 Likewise Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 
has demonstrated that supposed necessary conditions of democracy – such as cultural 
homogeneity – are not impediments to democratizing global governance.22 
Democratic states such as India, the United Kingdom, Canada, and South Africa can 
it seems work in settings that are multi-national, multi-lingual, and/or multi-ethnic. 
Lessons can be drawn from these cases for global democracy. 
                                                        
19 See also PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME (2004). 
20 Michael K. MacKenzie and Didier Caluwaerts, Deliberation and Long-Term Thinking on Climate 
Change Policy. Paper presented at CANADIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION Conference 
(2015). 
21 Arash Abizadeh, Does collective identity presuppose an other? On the alleged incoherence of global 
solidarity, 99(1) AM. POL. SCI. REV. (2005). 
22 Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Is global democracy possible? 17(3) EUR. J. OF I’NTL REL. (2010). 
 9 
 If global governance is plagued by deep emotional identity divides, 
deliberative democracy can help. There is now a substantial literature that shows how 
deliberative democracy can be applied in deeply divided societies.23   
 
3.3 The Infrastructure Gap 
Keohane argues that global democracy requires infrastructure – legal, institutional, 
and civil society – that is missing. While the international system does not have the 
same coercive nature of domestic legal structures, debates in international law 
continue over two issues: first, whether international law is constitutionalizing, and 
second, whether this is beneficial for global democracy. Krisch among others argues 
that the lack of final (constitutional) structures beyond the state is actually beneficial 
for building global democracy.24  
Surprisingly for an international relations scholar, Keohane sees the 
international system mainly in terms of what it lacks when compared to states, 
unbalanced by the opportunities it provides, especially when it comes to monitory and 
deliberative democracy. The absence of anything like sovereign authority at the 
international level means that more persuasion must occur. Of course this persuasion 
might be coercive and so not deliberative or democratic. But argument can sometimes 
be decisive.25 At any rate, the international system should be analyzed in its own 
terms – not as an anemic and incomplete version of the state. 
Even if we stay with states as our reference point, Keohane draws some 
questionable lessons. In pointing to the absence of a long tradition of the rule of law 
in international politics, he is actually describing the situation in most democratic 
                                                        
23 JUAN E. UGARRIZA AND DIDIER CALUWAERTS, EDS. DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION 
IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES: FROM CONFLICT TO COMMON GROUND (2014). 
24 Krisch, supra note 9. 
25 Thomas Risse, Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics, 54(1) INT’L ORG. 1-39 
(2000). 
 10 
states. If he were writing about (say) Japan and Germany around 1950 Keohane 
would presumably have dismissed their democratic prospects on this basis. And if 
global politics lacks social capital and an active/supportive civil society, that should 
be taken as a challenge, not an absolute. Global civil society does exist as a resource 
for democratization – if in very different form from what we find in (some) 
democratic states (in other democratic states it is extremely weak).26 We might, for 
example, think of global civil society in terms of a pattern of discursive 
representation.27 The fact that there are no international choral societies or bowling 
leagues is not a decisive argument against global democratization. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Democracy is not an all-or-nothing affair. It is always a matter of degree. The project 
of global democratization should be conceptualized not in terms of adoption of an 
overarching and predefined model (as Keohane’s ‘genuine democracy’ would seem to 
be), but rather as multiple moves that can increase the degree of democracy in the 
system. Such moves might for example entail: 
• The strengthening of accountability mechanisms, which can be seen as 
components of, rather than alternatives to, global democracy.28 
• The proliferation of monitory mechanisms. 
• Contemplation of ways to promote the deliberative aspects of international 
negotiations. 
                                                        
26 John S. Dryzek, Global Civil Society: The Progress of Post-Westphalian Politics, 15 ANN. REV. 
POL. SCI. 105-19 (2012). 
27 John S. Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer, Discursive Representation, 102(4) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 481-
93 (2008). 
28 Stevenson and Dryzek, supra note 18 at 154-6, criticizing Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane, 
Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99(1) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29-43 (2005). 
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• Attention to the deliberative qualities of transnational governance networks, 
and the exclusions those networks often feature. 
• Expansion of the range of discourses that are represented in decision-making 
processes. So for example if transnational social movements succeed in 
getting international economic institutions to address questions of social 
justice in their decisions, that is a democratizing move – in which light it 
matters little that activists or organizations are not themselves formally 
accountable to anyone. 
• Sortition initiatives that create a voice for ordinary citizens in governance. 
While the most relevant global experiment (World Wide Views) currently 
falls short of face-to-face deliberation of citizens from different countries, 
transnational citizen assemblies look a lot more feasible than elected bodies. 
 
Of course we should be vigilant such that democratizing moves are not merely 
‘nominal’ or components of ‘organized hypocrisy’ as Keohane would put it – though 
even here, we should not underestimate what Elster calls ‘the civilizing force of 
hypocrisy’, under which pretense induces behavioral change.29  
Ultimately the democratization of global governance is a normative goal to be 
strived toward through multiple avenues, not least deliberation. Keohane concludes 
by invoking Weber’s famous quote on the ‘slow boring of hard boards.’ Weber goes 
on to lament “a world too stupid or petty” but “in the face of that he [the political 
actor] must have the resolve to say ‘and yet’….” Global democratization is a 
transformative project that facing a recalcitrant world should continually say “and 
yet….” 
                                                        
29 Jon Elster, Introduction, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 12 (JON ELSTER, ed., 1998). 
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